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INTRODUCTION
For the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Holy Defense,
also known as the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), was
a titanic struggle pitting Iran’s revolutionary regime
and its Islamic values against not only Iraqi dictator
Saddam Hussein, but more ominously the United
States and the forces of Western imperialism. From
the Islamic Republic’s perspective, it won the war
by marshaling its economic and military resources,
repulsing the Western- and Gulf Arab-backed
Iraqi invader from its soil, and showing the world
that its revolution and Islamic values could not be
vanquished by economic pressure and force of arms.
As war veterans returned from the front, however,
they soon found the very revolution and Islamic
values they had fought for under attack. The enemy’s
weapons were no longer economic sanctions and
high-tech arms, but rather culture and political
ideals. The enemy’s targets were no longer economic
or military, but the hearts and minds of the Iranian
people, especially the youth. The Islamic Republic,
particularly the conservative political current who
would come to control most elected and unelected
centers of power in post-war Iran, struggled to find
a language to articulate the nature of this ephemeral
threat, alternatively calling it a “cultural assault,”
“cultural night-raid,” and “cultural NATO,” among
other things. By the late 2000s, Iranian Supreme
Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and Iranian
conservatives had converged on a single term for this
conflict: “soft war” (jang-e narm).
What is soft war? While the term is sometimes used
loosely and propagandistically by Iranian officials,
it arguably denotes a real conflict deeply rooted in
Iran’s modern history.1 Soft war is the exercise of
soft power by the United States on Iran such that it
creates security challenges for the Islamic Republic
and forces it to respond.2 The main challenge of soft
1

2
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For example, cyber-attacks are sometimes labeled as part of soft war.
However, cyber-attacks constitute an exercise of coercive or hard
power, whereas soft war, as normally used by Iranian conservatives,
involves the exercise of what international relations scholar
Joseph Nye calls “soft power.” Such distinctions are crucial for
understanding the nature of soft war and will be explored in greater
depth in part I.
Although soft war can be analyzed in the context of the exercise of

war is that large segments of the Iranian population
are attracted to the United States, embracing key
elements of its culture and political ideals, anathema
for a regime founded on Islamic values and antiAmericanism. As the gulf between the culture and
political ideals of the Islamic Republic versus large
segments of its population has widened, the regime’s
power to influence Iranians has weakened and it
has come under pressure to change its policies in a
number of domains. Iran’s strategy to address this
and other soft war challenges contains two main
responses. The first is a hard response that seeks to
control the conduits through which U.S. sources of
soft power, culture, political ideals, and policies,
enter Iran. These conduits include the Internet,
satellite television, and universities. The second is
a soft response that attempts to create indigenous
sources of soft power that are attractive to Iranians.
In practice, thus far Iran’s strategy has placed greater
emphasis on the hard response. Largely because the
Iranian regime has failed to utilize the capacity of
Iranian civil society to create attractive indigenous
sources of soft power, the regime has been on the
defensive in the soft war.
Part I of this analysis gives a basic definition of
soft war and lays out a theoretical framework for
understanding it using international relations scholar
Joseph Nye’s concept of soft power. Part II discusses
the historical genealogy of soft war by tracing two
distinct but interwoven threads: First, the rise of
Islamic nativism in Iran, and second, the rise and fall
of U.S. soft power in Iran from the mid-19th century
to the Islamic Revolution of 1979. Part III looks at
the genesis of soft war under the Islamic Republic
and how, while the terminology may be relatively
new, the phenomenon it denotes is much older. Part
IV analyzes Iran’s soft war strategy, comprising of a
hard and soft response. The conclusion assesses to
what extent this soft war strategy has been successful
and examines the factors which may shift the balance
in this conflict.
soft power by any single Western state on Iran, the focus here is on
the United States. This is because soft war in Iran today is typically
invoked with reference to the United States.

NOVEMBER 2013

I. THEORETICAL
FRAMEWORK
Soft war as a conflict can be best understood using the
idea of soft power coined by international relations
scholar Joseph Nye, and is explained below using
illustrations of the United States’ exercise of soft
power on Iran.3 According to Nye, soft power is the
“ability to get what you want through attraction rather
than coercion or payments. When you can get others
to want what you want, you do not have to spend
as much on sticks and carrots to move them in your
direction.”4 Here sticks and carrots refer to the wellestablished idea of hard power, which grows out of a
state’s economic and military strength. Soft power, in
contrast, comes from “the attractiveness of a country’s
culture, political ideals, and policies,” what Nye
collectively calls a country’s “primary currencies,”
or sources of soft power. Nye emphasizes that “It is
not smart to discount soft power as just a question of
image, public relations, and ephemeral popularity...
it is a form of power—a means of obtaining desired
outcomes.” He cites the example of U.S.-Pakistan
security cooperation, positing that although Pakistani
General Pervez Musharraf (1943- ) found it in his
interest to work with the United States in the War on
Terror, the level of anti-Americanism in his country
forced him to balance “concessions and retractions.”
Nye concludes that if the United States exercised
greater soft power on Pakistan, there would be more
concessions.5
Culture is perhaps the preeminent example of a source
of soft power. Nye remarks that “When a country’s
culture includes universal values and its policies
promote values and interests that others share, it
3

4
5

The similarity between the terms “soft power” and “soft war” is
likely not an accident. In fact, the concept of soft power may have
been a template for formulating the idea of soft war. The Islamic
Republic has a history of drawing on U.S. foreign policy and
international relations concepts when formulating its own, often
as a rejoinder. Thus, Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations”
became Mohammad Khatami’s “dialogue of civilizations,” and
George W. Bush’s “Axis of Evil” became the Islamic Republic’s
“Axis of Resistance.”
Joseph S. Nye, “Soft Power and American Foreign Policy.” Political
Science Quarterly Summer 119.2 (2004): 256.
Ibid., 257.

increases the probability of obtaining its desired
outcomes because of the relationships of attraction
and duty that it creates.”6 The United States is the
world’s pre-eminent exporter of culture—including
film, music, publishing and fashion—consumed by
billions of people around the globe. American culture
does not convey a uniform message. There are,
however, persistent themes that emerge over time,
for example individualism, and when packaged in
the right way these themes can speak to international
audiences and create a sense of attraction and shared
values and interests. Through American culture,
an Iranian may come to feel attracted to and share
certain values and interests with the United States and
its citizens. When this happens, and pro-American
Iranians have the power to bring about change, the
United States can more easily achieve its foreign
policy objectives in Iran.
Political ideals are another major source of soft power
and function in a similar way as culture. While the
United States has no monopoly on the political ideals
of self-determination, democracy or human rights, it
is not for nothing that the United States was called
the “leader of the free world” in the aftermath of the
Second World War. Then and now, the United States
is perceived by many as a defender of democracy
and human rights around the world, although its
credentials as an anti-colonial force have diminished
significantly. Policies as a source of soft power are
related to political ideals, but remain distinct. Nye
points out that to the extent that U.S. policies are
consistent with its political ideals, such as “democracy,
human rights, and openness,” the United States will
be better positioned to benefit from the trends of the
“global information age” and expand its soft power:
“Government policies at home and abroad are another
potential source of soft power...Domestic or foreign
policies that appear to be hypocritical, arrogant,
indifferent to the opinion of others, or based on a
6

Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics
(New York: Public Affairs, 2004), 11.
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narrow approach to national interests can undermine
soft power.”7 Thus, for instance, recent revelations
regarding U.S. cyber-surveillance practices toward
U.S. citizens make it more difficult for the United
States to promote human rights abroad and convince
foreign elites and audiences to abide by human rights
standards. The same is true with regard to policies
such as drone strikes on Yemen and Pakistan, which
undercut the ideal the United States projects about
being a responsible actor, versus a rogue state, in
global affairs.
Institutions are a source of soft power in a somewhat
different way than those areas outlined above. For
instance, international institutions can be a source of
soft power through their agenda-setting prerogative.
Using the example of international economic
governance, Nye argues that international institutions
working in this field “such as the International
Monetary Fund and the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade, tend to embody liberal, freemarket principles that coincide in large measure with
American society and ideology.”8 When other states
can be convinced to participate in these institutions,
they adapt to American values and agendas, often
reinforcing U.S. interests.
		
		
Soft power, through attraction and agenda-setting,
can legitimize a state’s power in the eyes of others
and lower resistance to a state’s pursuit of its goals.
If a state’s sources of soft power are attractive, others
are more likely to accede to its wishes. Likewise if
a state can use institutions to channel or constrain
the behavior of others, it is less likely to resort to
hard power, sparing it economic and military costs.
With this said, the exercise of soft power is more
complex than first meets the eye. The same sources
of soft power that are attractive in one context can
be unattractive in another: Culture that may generate
attraction in Tel Aviv may have the opposite effect in
Riyadh. Similarly, U.S. political ideals and policies
that may have a receptive audience in Tokyo may be
met with much greater skepticism in Beijing. Context
matters greatly; in part III we will show that since
7
8
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Ibid., 14.
Joseph S. Nye, “Soft Power.” Foreign Policy 80 (1990): 168.

1989 a unique context has existed in Iran whereby
U.S. sources of soft power have been able to attract
key segments of the Iranian population.9
While states have been aware of the concept of soft
power in some form or another throughout history,
the information revolution has created powerful new
conduits for projecting soft power. A state’s culture,
political ideals and policies can reach a far wider
audience on a much larger scale than ever before. Ever
more powerful and low-cost hardware combined with
increasingly better software means the exchange of
information may continue expanding and becoming
faster, meaning that states will likely have to pay
more attention to soft power in the future.10
The story of the conflict the Islamic Republic calls
soft war is in many ways the story of the exercise of
U.S. soft power on Iran. Two of the main impulses
underlying the foundation of the Islamic Republic
in 1979 were the creation of an Islamic social
and political order in Iran and anti-Americanism,
impulses which continue to operate today through
Khamenei and the conservative political current.
U.S. soft power on Iran poses security challenges
for the regime because, in the context of the ongoing
U.S-Iran geopolitical rivalry, it undermines both the
social and political order conservatives seek to create
and their anti-Americanism by creating a relationship
of attraction and shared values between the United
States and Iranians and alienating the latter from the
regime. The sense of threat felt by the conservatives
from U.S. soft power, and the articulation of soft war
as a conflict with the United States, is best illustrated
by Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei:
Everyone today understands and knows that
the confrontation between the Arrogance
[United States] with the Islamic Republic is
no longer like the confrontation of the first
decade of the revolution. In that confrontation
they exercised their power, and were defeated.
That was a hard confrontation...However
this is not the priority of the Arrogance for
9 Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics.
10 Joseph S. Nye, “The Information Revolution and American Soft
Power.” Asia-Pacific Review 9.1 (2002).
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confronting the Islamic regime. The priority
today is what is called soft war; that is war
using cultural tools, through infiltration [of
our society], through lies, through spreading
rumors. Through the advanced instruments
that exist today, communication tools that
did not exist 10, 15, and 30 years ago, have
become widespread. Soft war means creating
doubt in people’s hearts and minds.11
As if to underscore the seriousness of soft war,
Brigadier General Masoud Jazayeri, deputy chief
of the Islamic Republic of Iran Armed Forces
General Staff, announced the creation of a “soft war
headquarters” in late 2012 tasked with planning and
executing Iran’s soft war strategy. Jazayeri explained
soft war as follows:
The enemy, by making attractive and presenting
the Western lifestyle and upbringing, by its
scientific and educational monopoly, and
by spreading Western social behavior and
the production of deviant values and beliefs,
carries out its strategies in the soft war.12
In investigating conservatives’ ruminations on
soft war, a relatively consistent picture of their
fears emerges. U.S. exercise of soft power on
Iran has attracted segments of Iranian society
away from the regime and toward the United
States. Especially since 1989, the allegiance of
many Iranians to the regime has weakened and
Iranians have become more receptive to U.S.
culture, political ideals and policies. This increases
pressure for policy changes anathema to Iranian
conservatives, including social and political reforms
and reconciliation with the United States. Having
defined soft war by grounding it in the IR concept
of soft power, we will now try to more concretely
understand it through its historical genealogy.
11

“Bayanat Dar Jam-e Kasiri Az Basijiyan Keshvar. (A speech to a
large crow of the nation’s Basij)” The Center for Preserving and
Publishing the Works of Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei. 25
Nov. 2009. Online. Accessed 03 July 2013.
12 “Tashkil-e Gharargah-e Jang-e Narm dar Setad-e Koll-e Niruha-ye
Mosallah. (The formation of a soft war headquarters in the Islamic
Republic of Iran Armed Forces General Headquarters).” Fars News
Agency. 01 Dec. 2012. Online. Accessed 03 July 2013.
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II. HISTORICAL
GENEALOGY
How did the soft war come about? This section traces
the genealogy of soft war to two distinct but overlapping
trends: first, the gradual development of anti-Western
Islamic nativism in Iran from the 19th century onward
as a result of the country’s historical encounter with the
West culminating in the Islamic Revolution of 1979;
and second, the rise, fall and rise again of American
soft power in Iran over the same period. Specifically,
the precipitous decline of U.S. soft power in Iran
following the 1953 Anglo-America-backed coup
d’etat significantly strengthened anti-Western Islamic
nativists, who viewed Western influence on Iran as a
malady they called “Westoxification,” enabling their
triumph in the revolution. In its first bloody decade
of revolution and war the Islamic Republic, a strong
anti-Western Islamic nativist streak ingrained in its
DNA, attempted (with moderate success) to eliminate
Western influence through policies such as the “Cultural
Revolution.” However, the traumatic experience of
Iranian society with the Islamic Republic from 1979 to
1989, the coming of age of a new generation of Iranians
during the post-Iran-Iraq War era, and American
resurgence in the post-Cold War era all converged
to increase U.S. soft power in Iran after 1989. For a
regime in part premised on anti-Americanism, the
increase of its rival’s soft power undermines the
Islamic Republic’s hold over Iranian society, thereby
creating security challenges. The decision of the
Islamic Republic, dominated by Khamenei and the
conservatives, to address these challenges through a
hard and soft response has led to a conflict labeled by
the regime and here as soft war.

Historical origins of antiWesternism in Iran: 
1813-1953
The history of Iran’s encounter with modernity and
the West often starts with the series of wars between
Qajar Iran and Tsarist Russia, which culminated in the
loss of significant Iranian domains in the Caucasus
and Central Asia, enshrined in the treaties of Gulistan
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(1813) and Turkmenchay (1828).13 These traumatic
events signaled a process of long-term internal decline
and imperial encroachment for Iran lasting more than
a century. While imperial encroachment began with
the loss of territory to Tsarist Russia, it culminated
in a much more intimate and invasive penetration of
the Qajar state at the political and economic levels.
Qajar shahs, feeble and beholden to Great Britain,
Tsarist Russia and a host of other European powers,
virtually surrendered much of the state to these powers
and their agents in Iran. The most reviled examples
of this include the Tobacco Concession of 1890 and
the Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1919.14 These treaties,
concessions and conventions not only weakened the
writ of the Qajar regime, but also inflamed domestic
public opinion by undermining the interests and values
of various social, political and economic forces.
One of the earliest proto-anti-Western movements
was the Tobacco Revolt (1891), a nationwide boycott
of tobacco triggered by the Tobacco Concession,
which had given a British merchant control over the
tobacco industry inside Iran, thereby disenfranchising
Iranian farmers and merchants.15 A religious edict
by a respected religious figure, Grand Ayatollah
Mirza Mohammed Hassan Husseini Shirazi (18141896), became a rallying point for opposition to the
concession and led to its repeal. Episodes such as this
demonstrated the hostility to Western imperial policies
in Iran and foreshadowed the potential of Shi’a Islam
for political mobilization.
During this encounter with the West, the importation
of Western political ideals also engendered resistance
from certain forces, particularly from the Constitutional
13

Firuz Kazemzadeh, “Iranian Relations with Russia and the Soviet
Union, to 1921.” The Cambridge History of Iran. Ed. Avery Peter,
Gavin R. Hambly, and C. P. Melville. Vol. 7. (Cambridge: Cambridge
UP, 1991): 314-49.
14 Homa Katouzian, “The Campaign for the 1919 Agreement.” State and
Society in Iran: The Eclipse of the Qajars and the Emergence of the
Pahlavis. (London: I. B. Tauris: New York, 2000): 88-120.
15 Nikki R. Keddie, Religion and rebellion in Iran: The Tobacco Protest
of 1891-1892. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2012).
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Revolution onward. For example, the anti-constitutional
forces, whose leading personages included such
reviled figures as Mohammad Ali Shah (1872-1925)
and Sheikh Fazlollah Nouri (1843-1909), opposed the
creation of a Western-style constitution and parliament
in Iran. In fact, the Shi’a clergy were one of the main
bulwarks against modernization and Westernization as
they believed these trends undermined the very basis
of traditional power structures such as the Qajar court,
landed nobility and the clergy itself.16 This history
of Iran’s encounter with the West and imperialism in
many ways set the stage for the rise of anti-Western
Islamic nativism after the Anglo-American-backed
coup d’état in 1953.

A brief history of U.S. soft
power in Iran: 1853-1953
Understanding the history of United States-Iran
relations is crucial to comprehending the emergence of
soft war today. Despite the strong influence of U.S. soft
power in Iran in the first century of relations between
the two states, the 1953 coup d’état and the subsequent
policies of the United States and the Pahlavi regime in
Iran in the following quarter century created a profound
break in this soft power and laid the groundwork for
soft war. We begin our analysis in the mid-19th century
to better understand the full historical context of the
emergence of soft war.
U.S.-Iran relations began a century before 1953 with
the revered modernizing Iranian prime minister Mirza
Taghi Khan Farahani (1807-1852), better known as
Amir Kabir, who came into office in 1848. As outlined
above, Qajar Iran found itself crushed between the
imperial forces of Great Britain and Tsarist Russia. In
the years between the Treaty of Gulistan and the 1953
coup, the Qajar and Pahlavi regimes found themselves
constantly looking for a third force that could balance
out Britain and Russia. Amir Kabir sought out the
United States for precisely these ends. The United
States’ political ideals and policies—that is its anti16 This is not to say that all of the Shi’a clergy fell into this category. In
fact, segments of the clergy were one of the main driving forces behind
the Constitutional Revolution.

colonialism as a nation that had thrown off the shackles
of British control, combined with the fact that it did
not have interests in Iran—made it an attractive force
to counterbalance the imperial powers. In this sense,
Amir Kabir can be called the original architect of U.S.Iran relations. In October 1853 he helped conclude the
Treaty of Friendship and Navigation between the two
countries, shortly before he was killed and his foreign
policy program of closer ties with the United States
buried alongside him.
The death of Amir Kabir, however, did not end attempts
at engaging the United States. In the 1880s, Naser alDin Shah (1831-1896) revisited the establishment of
better ties with the United States. Under President
Chester A. Arthur (1829-1889), the United States
established high-level diplomatic ties with Iran,
sending Ambassador S.G.W. Benjamin (1837-1914)
in 1883 to Tehran as chargé d’affaires to create what
would eventually become a permanent mission.17 In
1886, Iran sent Haj Hossein Gholi Khan Motamed alVezareh (1849-1937) as minister plenipotentiary and
envoy extraordinary to Washington.18 He was soon
given the sobriquet “Haji Washington” for being the
first high-level Iranian representative in Washington,
D.C. Haji Washington wrote glowingly in his reports
back to Tehran about American culture, political ideals
and policies. He saw the United States as the nation
of the future, a model Iran should endeavor toward,
and a potential ally who could alleviate Iran’s strategic
dilemmas.
Despite the establishment of governmental ties during
the 19th century, Iranians’ day-to-day experience with
America was mostly through missionaries, scholars
and other private citizens. One of the most prominent
centers of secondary education in Iran today, Alborz
High School, was founded by American Presbyterian
missionary James Bassett (1834-1906).19 A young
Princeton-educated Presbyterian missionary, Howard
17 Badi Badiozamani, Iran and America: Rekindling a Love Lost. (New
York: East-West Understanding, 2005): 5-7.
18 Ibid., 8.
19 Thomas M. Ricks, “Alborz College of Tehran, Dr. Samuel Martin
Jordan and the American Faculty: Twentieth-Century Presbyterian
Mission Education and Modernism in Iran (Persia).” Iranian Studies
44.5 (2011): 627-46.
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Baskerville (1885-1909), became a martyr of the
Constitutional Revolution after he transformed his
class of students at the American Memorial High
School in Tabriz into a pro-constitutional column and
led them into battle.20
Americans in government capacities also played
significant positive roles in Iran’s national progress
through institution-building. After the Constitutional
Revolution, Jewish-American financial expert
William Morgan Shuster (1877-1960) was
appointed by the young Iranian parliament at the
recommendation of U.S. President Howard William
Taft in 1911 to put Iran’s disastrous financial affairs in
order.21 The diligent work of Shuster to promote tax
collection and administrative efficiency endangered
the interests of the British and Russians, who profited
greatly from the disorder and corruption in Iran. As
a result the Russian government gave an ultimatum
to parliament to remove Shuster, and its military
forces bombarded parliament to force Shuster out
in December 1911.22 The departure of Shuster led
to public demonstrations. Renowned composer and
poet Aref Ghazvini (1882-1934), considered the
father of Iranian protest music, even wrote a poemsong defending Shuster as a savior of the nation and
lambasting domestic corruption of politicians and the
intervention of foreign powers:
Woe upon the house whose guest departs it
Lay down your life and do not let the guest
leave
If Shuster leaves Iran, Iran will be thrown to
the wind
Oh youth do not let Iran be rent asunder
You [Shuster] are life to the dead body, you are
the life of a world, you are royal treasure, You
are eternal life, God willing you will remain,
God willing you will remain...23
20 James A. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of AmericanIranian Relations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988): 16.
21 U.S. State Department adviser Arthur Chester Millspaugh (1883–
1955) played a similar role to Shuster during the Pahlavi regime.
See: Arthur Chester Millspaugh, Americans in Persia. (Washington,
D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1946).
22 W. Morgan Shuster, The Strangling of Persia. (New York: The
Century Co., 1912).
23 Homa Katouzian, “Poetry of the Constitutional Revolution.” Homa
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It was, not surprisingly, what many consider the first
clashes of the Cold War that drew the United States
into Iran at a strategic level. In 1946, the Soviet
Union, which had occupied northern Iran between
1941 and 1945 as part of the Allied struggle against
Nazi Germany, reneged on its promise to withdraw
from Iran and helped create two client states in Iran’s
Kurdistan and Azerbaijan regions.24 It was decisive
American pressure under President Harry S. Truman
(1884-1972) that forced the Soviets to withdraw in
May 1946. These episodes before 1953 placed the
United States in a very positive light in Iran. As the
examples above demonstrate, the first century of
U.S.-Iran relations was strongly positive and a period
during which U.S. primary currencies were very
attractive in Iran. With the dawn of the Cold War,
however, a century of goodwill would be rapidly
undone.

Operation Ajax and the rise
of anti-Americanism: 19531979
The tumultuous events of 1953 and the quarter
century that followed would see the collision of
more than a century of good U.S.-Iran relations
with a strong anti-Western current in Iran’s polity,
leading to the birth of a potent anti-Americanism
that laid the foundations of soft war. The events of
Operation Ajax, the August 1953 coup d’état that
overthrew the democratically elected Iranian Prime
Minister Mohammad Mossadegh and suppressed
the oil nationalization movement, have been well
documented and will not be elaborated upon here.25
Suffice it to say that the United States, with the
provocation of Great Britain, played a major role in
the overthrow of Mossadegh and the establishment
of Shah Mohammad-Reza Pahlavi as an absolute
monarch. There are several ironies in the central
role the United States played in the coup. First, for
Katouzian. Online. Accessed 03 July 2013.
Fernande Raine, “Stalin and the Creation of the Azerbaijan
Democratic Party in Iran, 1945.” Cold War History 2.1 (2001);
Archie Roosevelt, Jr. “The Kurdish Republic of Mahabad.” Middle
East Journal 1.3 (1947).
25 Stephen Kinzer, All the Shah’s Men: An American Coup and the
Roots of Middle East Terror. (Hoboken: J. Wiley & Sons, 2003).
24
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much of the pre-Cold War era the United States had
had an anti-colonial streak, in part because of its
history as a British colony. During Mossadegh’s oil
nationalization campaign President Harry Truman
did not take kindly to British machinations in Iran
and was not enthusiastic about Britain’s efforts to
foment a coup. Second, Mossadegh himself was at
times considered an Americophile and looked to the
United States, in much the same way Amir Kabir had,
to balance out what he considered to be the nefarious
influence of Great Britain and the Soviet Union.
Despite this alignment of thinking and interests,
however, the Dwight Eisenhower (1890-1969)
administration took steps to neutralize Mossadegh,
in part because it viewed the oil nationalization issue
through a Cold War lens. The fear was that Iran’s
pro-Soviet communist party was waiting in the wings
to seize power.26
The 1953 coup resulted in a wave of political
repression and the establishment of a government
pliant to American and British interests on Cold War
and oil issues. The coup left an indelible mark on
20th century Iranian politics and played a key role in
creating the extreme anti-Pahlavi and anti-American
sentiments that led to the revolution in 1979. Given
what we now know now about the illusory nature of
the communist threat in Iran during this period, it
appears that the United States obliterated soft power
that it had built up over a century in order to secure
British oil interests. Subsequent history makes it
clear that this prize may well have not been worth
the price. But the coup is only a part of the story of
the rise of anti-Americanism in Iran in the quarter
century between the fall of Mossadegh in 1953 and
the rise of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1979.
Several other aspects of U.S. foreign policy toward
Iran created outrage in Iranian public opinion.
The U.S.-Israeli contribution to the creation of the
Pahlavi regime’s despised secret police, the National
Security and Intelligence Organization (SAVAK)—
responsible for the arrest, torture, and execution
26 Ervand Abrahamian, “The Tudeh Party.” Iran Between Two
Revolutions. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982): 281-325.

of hundreds of Iranians—was perceived as a very
real manifestation of U.S. oppression of the Iranian
people. The Richard Nixon administration’s attempt
to make Iran its regional policeman under the Guam
Doctrine created a sense that Iran no longer had even
the semblance of an independent foreign policy. The
coup and the strong support provided by the United
States to the Pahlavi regime also made many Iranians
feel that the latter only existed at the whims of the
former. In the long term, this meant that the worst
of the Pahlavi regime’s excesses became associated
with the United States.27 The hand of the United States
was seen as being behind every negative occurrence:
the Pahlavi regime’s troubling human rights record,
its lopsided economic policies, and the capitulation
of 1964 which exempted U.S. government personnel
and their families from the Iranian justice system.
From this perspective, which began to gain wide
acceptance in the late 1960s, those who sought to
strike down the Pahlavi regime believed they had to
first strike at its puppeteer, the United States. As Nye
warns can happen when political ideals and policies
clash, this mismatch between U.S. political ideals
such as human rights and democracy and its Cold
War foreign policy seriously eroded the attractiveness
of U.S. primary currencies in Iran and created an
environment where anti-Americanism thrived.

Anti-imperialism and
Westoxification: 1953-1979
The Tudeh & anti-imperialism
Anti-Americanism in Iran is often associated with
the Khomeinists who seized the U.S. embassy in
Tehran in 1979. Yet in adopting anti-imperialism
and especially anti-Americanism as key elements in
their ideological framework, the Khomeinists were
not innovating but merely tapping into the zeitgeist
and a pre-existing deep reservoir of negative feelings
toward the United States in the Iranian polity. The
intellectual machinery of anti-Americanism was in
fact pioneered by the Iranian left and a group which
27 Ervand Abrahamian, “Iran in Revolution: The Opposition Forces.”
MERIP 75/76. Mar. - Apr. (1979).

Page 11

Soft War - A new episode in the old conflict between Iran and the United States

political scientist Mehrzad Boroujerdi has called
Iranian nativist intellectuals.28
Arguably, the foundations of the virulent antiAmericanism of the 1979 revolution were laid by
the Tudeh Party of Iran (Hezb-e Tudeh-e Iran), Iran’s
pro-Soviet communist party. Despite facing a high
level of repression throughout its life, the Tudeh
during the 1940s and 1950s was able to build one
of the most disciplined and effective mass political
organizations in Iran’s modern history.29 Given the
Soviet Union’s tremendous soft power at the time,
the Tudeh became a magnet for intellectuals and
left a strong imprint on the opposition politics of
the period.30 It was one of the first political parties
in Iran to articulate a coherent anti-Imperialist, and
specifically anti-American, discourse. This was in
line with the organization’s Cold War politics, which
demanded unswerving loyalty to the Soviet Union
and hostility to its enemies. As a CIA report from
1949 stated:
From 1946 on, the [Tudeh] party organs have
parroted Soviet pronouncements about the U.S.
… A party directive of October 1948 ordered
that “the U.S. in general and U.S. policy in
Iran, with emphasis on the arms credit program
in particular, should be subject to severe press
attacks”... [Tudeh] has flatly accused the U.S.
of having an imperialistic policy “designed
to enforce American political, economic, and
military rule all over the world.”31
The Tudeh was almost unique in advocating a strong
anti-Americanism during the oil nationalization
campaign. While the Tudeh was heavily repressed
after 1953 and would never quite regain its former
strength, its anti-Americanism would live on and
combine with a broader backlash against the United
States after 1953. As outlined above, this backlash
Mehrzad Boroujerdi, Iranian Intellectuals and the West: The
Tormented Triumph of Nativism. (Syracuse: Syracuse University
Press, 1996).
29 Abrahamian, “The Tudeh Party.”
30 L. P. Elwell-Sutton, “Political Parties in Iran 1941-1948.” Middle
East Journal 3.1 (1949).
31 “The Tudeh Party: Vehicle of Communism in Iran” Rep. no. ORE
23-49. (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 1949): 7.

was aggravated by the policies of the Pahlavi regime,
which were perceived as having America’s full
backing.

Iranian nativist intellectuals &
Westoxification
The Anglo-American coup d’etat in 1953, U.S.
foreign policy in the post-coup era, and many of the
Pahlavi regime’s unpopular policies, which were
attributed to the United States, led to a precipitous
decline in U.S. soft power in Iran. In such a climate,
the Tudeh’s anti-Americanism could thrive. The
intellectual and organizational vacuum left by the
effective repression of the Tudeh and National Front
in the post-coup era meant that the mantle of antiAmericanism was picked up by a younger generation
who were radicalized by their experiences during
this period. Diverse in origin, this generation was
defined by a group which Boroujerdi has called
Iranian nativist intellectuals. Boroujerdi defines
“nativism” as “the doctrine that calls for the
resurgence, reinstatement or continuance of native
or indigenous cultural customs, beliefs and values.
Nativism is grounded on such deeply held beliefs
as resisting acculturation, privileging one’s own
‘authentic’ identity, and longing for a return to “an
unsullied indigenous cultural tradition.”32 Whereas
the Tudeh’s communism and the National Front’s
liberal nationalism had been Western in origin,
Iranian nativists rejected all that was Western as an
affliction and sought to rediscover Iran’s authentic
identity. Put in Nye’s soft power framework, nativists
rejected Western primary currencies for indigenous
ones. In the post-1953 nativist turn these intellectuals
did not emphasize Iran’s pre-Islamic “Aryan”
identity, but an Islamic one. As Ali Shari’ati, one of
Iran’s most prominent intellectuals and the leading
political thinker of this period, pointed out:
Islamic civilization has worked like scissors
and has cut us off completely from our preIslamic past...Our people do not find their roots
in these civilizations. They are left unmoved by
the heroes, geniuses, myths, and monuments of

28
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these ancient empires. Our people remember
nothing from this distant past and do not care
to learn about the pre-Islamic civilizations...
Consequently, for us return to our roots means
not a rediscovery of pre-Islamic Iran, but a
return to our Islamic, especially Shi’i, roots.33
Many of the most prominent intellectual architects
of this Islamic nativist project were lay secular and
religious thinkers. Few others, with the possible
exception of Shari’ati, exemplify the lay Islamic
nativists better than Jalal Al-e Ahmad. Over the course
of his career, Al-e Ahmad migrated from the secular
left to Islamic nativism. His 1962 monograph, entitled
Westoxification, was an intellectual bombshell that
set the tone for Islamic nativism in Iran for decades
to come, and is perhaps one of the most important
intellectual sources of the soft war today.
Al-e Ahmad popularized Westoxification to the
extent that the concept became a staple of the
Iranian opposition’s critique of the Pahlavi regime’s
modernization program and continues to exist in the
Islamic Republic’s political lexicon. Westoxification,
according to Al-e Ahmad, was an affliction that
alienated Iranians from their roots, perpetrated by
the West through its penetration of Iran and through
Westoxicated Iranians. Al-e Ahmad viewed the West,
via its machinery and technology, as being corrosive
to traditional Iranian society.34 As Boroujerdi points
out, “Al-e Ahmad believed that this pandemic
could result in the eradication of Iran’s cultural
authenticity, political sovereignty, and economic
well-being.”35 The “vaccine” posited by Al-e Ahmad
to the disease of Westoxifcation was Shi’a Islam,
which he maintained had attained a special place in
the Iranian social psyche as an inseparable aspect of
Iranian identity.36
33 Abrahamian, Iran Between Two Revolutions, 470.
34 For example, see Boroujerdi, Iranian Intellectuals and the West, 70:
“As the machine entrenches itself in the towns and villages, be it in
the form of a mechanized mill or textile plant, it puts the worker in
local craft industries out of work. It closes the village mill. It renders
the spinning wheel useless. Production of pile carpets, flat carpets,
felt carpets is at an end.”
35 Ibid., 68.
36 Ibid., 72.

This anti-Western Islamic nativism had a profound
influence in shaping the post-1953 political opposition,
and with the victory of the Islamic Revolution in 1979
moved from the intellectual margins to underpin the
Islamic Republic’s ideological framework.

The Islamic Revolution
and the height of antiAmericanism: 1979-1989
While the Islamic Revolution of 1979 began as a
pluralistic movement against the Pahlavi regime, it
ended with the triumph of the Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini and his Islamist followers. At the center
of the ideological framework of the Islamic Republic
created by Khomeini was a political Islam deeply
influenced by the post-1953 Islamic nativism. From
the outset the new regime, which had authoritarian
tendencies, was premised on asserting an authentic
Islamic identity for Iran and anti-Westernism. The
decline of U.S. soft power in Iran was thus accelerated
by the Islamic Republic, which tapped into the genuine
popular enthusiasm for the revolution to create its
own sources of soft power and to attack conduits of
U.S. soft power. Whether the culture of the Islamic
hijab, which promoted modesty, or the political ideal
of “Guardianship of the Jurist” (velayat-e faghih),
which attempted to reconcile divinely sanctioned
government with popular participation, the Islamic
Republic was able to generate new sources of soft
power with genuine popular support inside and
outside the country.
The new regime’s authoritarian tendency alongside
its anti-Westernism worked together to restrict U.S.
soft power and its conduits. Mass media, including
television, radio, books, newspapers, magazines,
films and music cassettes, were regulated to include
content produced by the regime and exclude content
deemed “un-Islamic.” Universities, important
centers for the production of knowledge and elites,
were also brought under attack. What came to be
known as the Cultural Revolution is perhaps one of
the clearest expressions of the political consequences
of anti-Western Islamic nativism. In July 1980,
Khomeini appointed seven trusted subordinates to
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the Council of the Cultural Revolution (CCR), which
was tasked with Islamizing the university space and
curriculum and did so through two primary means.37
First, a regime-backed student group, the Office for
Consolidating Unity in Seminaries and Universities
(OCU), enforced a strict Islamic code of behavior
and dress, expelled “un-Islamic” students and faculty
and quashed dissent. Second, the CCR attempted
to Islamize university curricula, particularly in the
social sciences and humanities. During the 19791980 academic year, the regime closed universities
to Islamize them, and an unprecedented purge
commenced. When universities reopened in 1983,
only 148,117 of 217,174 students were allowed to
return. An unknown number were never allowed
37 The members of the Council included Jalaledin Farsi, Shams Al-e
Ahmad (brother of the famous Jalal Al-e Ahmad), Rabani Amlashi,
Mohammad Javad Bahnoar, Hassan Habibi, Ali Shariatmadari and
Abdul-Karim Soroush.
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to enter university from high school. Purges also
expelled numerous faculty members.38
Therefore, in the years immediately following the
revolution the balance of soft power shifted in favor
of the Islamic Republic. Yet by the end of the decade
following 1979 the pendulum began swinging in the
other direction. The reasons for this were manifold,
but included the suffocating social atmosphere,
the absence of political pluralism promised by
the revolution, the bleak economic situation, the
execution, torture and imprisonment of tens of
thousands as part of the revolutionary terror, and
hundreds of thousands of casualties in the Iran-Iraq
War. The changing international situation after 1989
decisively pushed the pendulum in favor of U.S. soft
power. This is the milieu in which soft war emerged.
38

Mehrak Kamali, “Goftogu Ba Mohammad Maleki: Kasi Az Ma
Nazar Nakhaast (Interview with Mohammad Maleki: No One Asked
for Our Opinion).” M.ghaed. Dec. 1999. Online. Accessed 03 July
2013.
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III. SOFT WAR IN THE
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC
OF IRAN
While the term soft war itself has only existed
since the late 2000s,39 it captures a conflict that
the regime has faced since its inception. Given the
Islamic Republic’s authoritarian tendencies, its
Islamic and anti-American foundations, and its 30year long conflict with the United States, it is not
difficult to see why the ability of U.S. soft power to
influence a large segment of Iran’s population poses
security challenges for the governing authorities.
For instance, in the realm of political ideals the
desire of many Iranians for democracy and human
rights in the Western sense can run counter to the
Islamic Republic’s political ideal of “Guardianship
of the Jurist.” When those segments of the Iranian
population who share American political ideals
actively struggle for them, as some believe happened
in the Green Movement demonstrations, they
can threaten the ideological edifice of the Islamic
Republic and the power of Iranian conservatives.
Of course, we must be careful not to essentialize the
Islamic Republic in the discussion of soft war. Not all
political currents in the Islamic Republic have been
fully committed to anti-Western Islamic nativism—
especially since 1989. It is the conservatives,
who tend to be more politically authoritarian and
socially conservative than their rivals and dominate
the majority of the regime’s elected and unelected
centers of power, who have been most committed to
nativism and felt most threatened by U.S. soft power.
What follows traces how the United States once
again came to exercise soft power on Iran after 1989.

Shift in the balance of soft
power: 1989-present
The swinging of the pendulum back toward U.S.
soft power in Iran dates to the late 1980s/early
1990s. Domestically, the death of Khomeini, the
39 The earliest example found by the authors was in 2007.

need for reconstruction in the bloody aftermath of
the revolution and war, and dissatisfaction with the
regime among Iranians at large created the impetus
for wide-scale change within Iran. Internationally,
the collapse of the Soviet Union and the beginning
of the American unipolar moment vastly expanded
U.S. soft power and made it more difficult for Iran
to ignore this power. From this point forward, three
mutually reinforcing processes would make Iran
fertile soil for U.S. sources of soft power.
First, a new and younger generation of Iranians, a
product of the post-revolution baby boom, who had
not experienced the Pahlavi regime, the Islamic
Revolution or the Iran-Iraq War as adults, began to
mature. They entered society via universities, the
workplace and polling booths, and took their place
as citizens. The old slogans of the revolution did
not represent many of their needs or desires. Having
grown up in the socially suffocating, economically
bleak and politically repressive revolutionary
and war eras, these young citizens sought greater
social freedom, economic opportunity and political
representation.40 Second, this new generation
drove and in turn was driven by developments on
the political front. The presidency of Ali-Akbar
Hashemi-Rafsanjani (1989-1997) kicked off Iran’s
re-opening to the world via limited economic
liberalization and diplomatic gestures. Then in 1997
Mohammad Khatami was elected president (19972005). The Reformists, led by Khatami, riding on the
needs and desires of the younger generation and their
disaffected parents, broke onto the political stage
and won successive electoral victories in presidential
and parliamentary elections. The Reformists’
advocacy for “civil society,” entailing greater social,
political and cultural pluralism, and “dialogue of
40

Farhad Khosrokhavar, “Post Revolutionary Iran and the New
Social Movements.” Twenty Years of Islamic Revolution: Political
and Social Transition in Iran since 1979. Ed. Eric J. Hooglund.
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2002): 3-18.
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civilizations,” which involved the re-establishment
of friendly ties with the West, somewhat expanded
the social and political space in which the new
generation could make their demands. Finally, the
relatively more open atmosphere in universities
beginning in 1989 and gradually improving until
2005 created a unique space for Iranian academics
and students, particularly in the social sciences and
humanities, to explore a broader range of ideas.
Universities once again became vibrant forums for a
wide range of social, political, economic and cultural
debates where Western ideas were able to exert an
increasingly powerful influence. The movement to
translate Western works into Farsi familiarized Iran’s
best and brightest at elite universities with the West’s
intellectual legacies.
These three mutually reinforcing processes created
a small opening through which U.S. sources
of soft power could trickle in, and advances in
communications technology that took hold in Iran
in the mid-1990s turned this trickle into a flood.
Satellite television and the Internet became powerful
new conduits for the U.S. primary currencies.
Before the mid-1990s Iranians’ access to alternative
communication media not approved by the regime
was limited to Western radio broadcasts and
bootlegged audio and video cassettes which were
carefully circulated between friends and family.
With the entry of illegal satellite dishes Iranians
now had access to a wider selection of content, from
television series that promoted alternative lifestyles
to news programs that presented narratives starkly
different from those of the regime. The global
Internet, introduced around the same period, had
a similar effect but on a larger scale because of
its accessibility through universities, cafes and
eventually homes. Popular demand, the Khatami
administration’s investment in telecommunication
infrastructure, and weak regulation of the Internet
early on made it an especially potent conduit for
U.S. sources of soft power.
These processes in the post-1989 context transformed
Iran’s youth in the cultural, social and political
spheres into a group that the regime had increasing

Page 16

difficulty controlling, particularly in urban areas
where most Iranians reside. Western culture, despite
being officially banned, was gradually seeping into
the bones of Iranian society. Regime-enforced social
norms began to change as well, with many youth
rejecting traditional Islamic values for Western ones.
The crème of Iran’s youth, those who performed well
in the grueling national university entrance exams
and won international science olympiads, opted to
pursue careers in the West because of the lack of
opportunities in Iran and the attractiveness of cuttingedge Western universities. This started the first major
wave of brain drain since the revolution and war. On
the political front, the political ideal of Guardianship
of the Jurist came under critique in public spaces and
regime policies were scrutinized as never before.
When taken together, this meant that there was an
increasingly large gap between the culture, political
ideals, and policy preferences of large segments of
society on one hand and the regime on the other.
The concepts of “cultural assault,” “cultural nightraid” and “cultural NATO,” predecessors of the
concept of soft war in the regime’s lexicon, emerged
in this context. What elevated the exercise of U.S. soft
power on Iran to a “war” for Iranian conservatives
during the presidency of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
(2005-2013) were geo-political tensions with the
United States and the fear of regime change. The
color revolutions of the former Soviet bloc in the
2000s, which had varying degrees of U.S. support,
convinced the Islamic Republic that its own people
could be co-opted by the United States as Trojan
horses to overthrow the regime. Indeed, this fear
seemingly became a reality during the June 2009 to
February 2011 Green Movement demonstrations. To
Iranian conservatives, the demonstrators of the Green
Movement represented culture, political ideals, and
policy preferences anathema to their own. In the
aftermath of the repression of the Green Movement,
the regime decided that an improved strategy for
the soft war was needed. The next section covers
the Islamic Republic’s strategy in the soft war. The
regime is still grappling with how to deal with U.S.
soft power and has only been partially successful in
responding to it.
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IV. HARD & SOFT
RESPONSES
What has the Islamic Republic’s strategy been for
fighting the soft war? It has not formally articulated
a coherent strategy, but from a observation of its
actions the image of a de facto strategy emerges.
This strategy has rested on two pillars: a hard and
soft response. As we will show, while the Islamic
Republic has been relatively successful in using
coercive means to limit U.S primary currencies
(hard response), it has been much less successful
in creating attractive indigenous primary currencies
(soft response). This is because primary currencies,
or sources of soft power, are not monopolized by the
state but are mainly produced by civil society. The
repression of civil society by the Iranian state has
crippled its ability to generate attractive sources of
soft power. Given the Islamic Republic’s emphasis
on controlling conduits of U.S. sources of soft power
through a hard response, we begin by investigating
three examples of these conduits before turning to
the regime’s strategy in earnest.

The conduits of U.S. soft
power
The Islamic Republic’s leadership considers the
Internet as one of the biggest purveyors of U.S.
primary currencies. Not only can the Internet
be used to consume a wide range of content in
multiple formats, it also serves as an optimal tool
for communication and social networking. Gmail,
Facebook and Twitter are all perceived as conduits
for seditious individuals to communicate and create
social networks that undermine Iranian society’s
Islamic socio-cultural values and the regime’s
political ideals and policies.41
Another challenge has been the creation of an
alternative Farsi media targeted at Iranians by
Western governments and Iranians in the diaspora,
mainly via satellite television. The Voice of America
41 “Momen-Nasab: Beware the Evils of Google!” IranPolitik. 23 Aug.
2011. Online. Accessed 03 July 2013.

(VOA) Persian News Network (PNN) and British
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) Persian service
have now become major sources of Farsi content,
especially news. VOA’s former show Parazit, a
weekly political satire program, gave a satiric look
at the regime’s leadership not provided by traditional
media within Iran, to popular acclaim among young
Iranians.42 Manoto TV, a private satellite network
with a greater focus on entertainment, showcases a
new generation of Iranian actors, broadcasters and
musicians as well as decidedly Western-leaning
socio-cultural values. The network has found success
by its ability to attract talent and showcase work
that falls outside of the regime’s boundaries. As this
alternative media grows, it makes U.S. sources of
soft power easier for Iranian audiences to absorb and
threatens to divert them from regime programming.
A third key conduit of soft power are universities, and
in particular social sciences and the humanities. As
outlined in Part III, despite the Cultural Revolution,
Western social sciences and the humanities began
re-entering Iranian universities in a major way
in the 1990s and 2000s. Although the regime has
not always strictly problematized the diffusion of
Western social sciences and the humanities through
Iranian universities as soft war, statements by senior
Iranian leaders make clear that it is viewed within the
same framework. Iran’s supreme leader has stated
quite succinctly why the threat of the diffusion of
Western “human sciences,” the term used in Iran for
the social sciences and humanities, through Iranian
universities can be seen as part of soft war. Speaking
to a gathering of seminary students, Khamenei
warned of the dangers and alien nature of Western
human sciences to Islamic Iran and underlined why
it is important for the country to produce its own
indigenous human science:

42 “Iran’s ‘Daily Show.’” CNN. 13 Jan. 2011. Online. Accessed 03 July
2013.
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This human science which is current today has
content which is essentially in opposition to the
Islamic movement and Islamic regime; it relies
on another ideology, it has another argument,
and has a different goal. When these [human
sciences] become current, officials become
trained according to them; the very same
officials come to lead universities, the national
economy, and domestic, foreign, and security
policies, etc.43

Hard responses
The core of the Islamic Republic’s strategy for dealing
with U.S. soft power has been overwhelmingly
characterized by the use of hard responses—the use
of coercive measures—to disrupt the conduits of U.S.
primary currencies. In September 2012, the Islamic
Republic announced implementation of phase one
of the National Information Network (NIN) project.
According to the regime, this initiative seeks to
severely limit Iranians’ access to the global Internet
by creating a national intranet. Phase one took
42,000 sensitive government computers offline and
onto the NIN, and later phases would do the same
for most other computers in the country.44 By forcing
most inside Iran onto the NIN, the regime could not
only more effectively limit the content individuals
consume, but would also be able to better monitor
them and feed them with state-produced content. As
of the time of writing, however, it remains unclear
what the NIN will look like in its final form and how
isolated Iranians will be from the Internet.
Even without the NIN, however, the regime still
has a fairly powerful Internet filtering regime in
place. With the assistance of Chinese, Russian
and European telecommunications software and
hardware makers,45 the Islamic Republic has been
43

“Bayanat dar Didar-e Tolab, Fozala va Asatid Hawzeh-ye Elmieh
Qom (Speech in a meeting with the students and scholars of the
hawzeh of Qom).” The Center for Preserving and Publishing the
Works of Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei. 21 Oct. 2010.
Online. Accessed 03 July 2013.
44 “Iranian Information Minister: National Internet to Cut off All
Government Computers from the World Wide Web.” IranPolitik. 19
Sept. 2012. Online. Accessed 03 July 2013.
45 Eli Lake, “Fed Contractor, Cell Phone Maker Sold Spy System to
Iran.” The Washington Times. 13 Apr. 2009. Online. Accessed 03
July 2013.

Page 18

able to create mechanisms to block ordinary Iranians
from seeing content it deems undesirable, monitor
their activities and slow the Internet down to a trickle
during sensitive periods when e-mail and online
social networks could help mobilize large numbers of
people. This process was intensified by the creation
of the cyber police in February 2011, which enabled
the regime to bring its persecution of online activists
within a legal framework and apply prison sentences
and physical intimidation as means to control their
activities.46 The arrest of blogger Sattar Beheshiti,
who later died in police custody, is just one example
of this.47 The process of greater state control over the
Internet has also been extended more informally, for
instance by an IRGC affiliate’s acquisition of Iran’s
main Internet provider and largest telecom firm, the
Telecommunication Company of Iran (TCI).48
Like much of the Islamic Republic’s policymaking,
however, the use of hard responses to limit the
penetration of U.S. sources soft power through the
Internet has been done in an ad hoc and diffuse
manner. With the creation of the Supreme Council of
Cyberspace (SCC), formed under the direct orders of
Khamenei to institute a comprehensive policy plan
for cyberspace, this may now be changing.49 The SCC
brings together a wide range of key power-brokers
in the regime, including the president, speaker of
parliament, chief justice, commander of the IRGC
and minister of intelligence, among others.
To confront the beaming of foreign satellite
television programs into Iran, the regime has used
similarly hard responses. The sale and possession
of unlicensed satellite dishes and receivers in Iran
is punishable under the law by fines and prison
46

“Fata, Vahed-e Jadide Polic-e Iran Bara-ye Control-e Faza-ye
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BBC - Persian. 23 Jan. 2011. Online. Accessed 03 July 2013.
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Feared Dead in Custody.” The Guardian. 07 Nov. 2012. Online.
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sentences.50 Outside these legal deterrents, the
regime regularly raids homes in order to collect or
destroy satellite dishes on people’s rooftops. Finally,
the regime uses satellite jamming to block much of
the undesired satellite transmissions from beaming
into Iranian homes. These latter two policies have
even generated varying degrees of criticism from
within the regime.51
The Islamic Republic’s policies for fighting the
soft war in universities have been similar to those
used during the Cultural Revolution of the 1980s,
albeit less extreme. Since 2005 many professors
have been forcibly retired or purged,52 and this
process was accelerated after the Green Movement
demonstrations.53 Since 2006 the regime has created
a “star” system to identify troublesome students
and exclude them from higher education.54 In
Iran’s hyper-competitive education system, where
admission to elite universities can be the difference
between success and failure in life, the star system
has had a chilling effect on campus social and
political activism as well as students’ desire to pursue
social science and humanities degrees. The regime
has also historically had a system of quotas that
ensures that there is a higher proportion of university
students from its core constituencies, including the
Mobilization Resistance Force (better known as the
“Basij”). Next, the regime has once again started
imposing the Islamic moral code in universities,
50
51
52
53
54
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limiting male-female interaction and implementing a
dress code. Finally, sensing a threat from the high
proportion of females in universities and decreasing
marriage and birth rates, the regime created quotas in
2012 to limit women in universities.55
The regime has supplemented the hard response in its
strategy by building better conduits of the sources of
soft power. Domestically, this has been characterized
by an increasing presence online, such as the creation
of a Facebook account by Khamenei,56 and greater
professionalism in existing media outlets. Abroad,
this has entailed the creation of new conduits. The
prime example of this has been Press TV, the Islamic
Republic’s 24-hour English-language international
news channel. Press TV plays to foreign audiences
by emphasizing Islamic, anti-Imperialist and antiAmerican themes. It is questionable, however, how
successful these efforts have been. At best, they
appear to be half measures that repackage Iran’s
waning primary currencies at home and abroad. The
Islamic Republic’s real shortcoming, however, has
been in generating new attractive indigenous sources
of soft power.

Building the sources of soft
power
While in the first decade after the Islamic Revolution
of 1979 the Islamic Republic was able to build
attractive indigenous sources of soft power and
even project soft power abroad, since 1989 its
soft power has declined. At least two causes have
been at the center of this decline. First, the Islamic
Republic lacks the economic dynamism that is often
a prerequisite for producing the financial and social
capital that underlies attractive sources of soft power.
Second, there has been no systematic government
policy for allocating adequate funding and providing
the right legal and regulatory framework to facilitate
the production of attractive sources of soft power.
Iranian conservatives, who have dominated the
regime in the post-1989 period, have blocked elite55
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and grassroots-level initiatives for creating attractive
sources of soft power.
The lack of a vibrant economy places significant
restraints on the creation of attractive primary
currencies for generating soft power. The United
States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan, and,
increasingly, emerging economies such as China and
India, to list just a few, have all been able to develop
attractive sources of soft power in part because of
powerful economies. For example, the United States’
economic vitality has allowed it to create well-funded
and advanced film, music and fashion industries
that are able to market their best cultural products
globally. Likewise, the powerful U.S. economy has
enabled the creation of well-endowed universities
that conduct cutting-edge research and attract some
of the world’s top minds, consequently setting much
of the international research and teaching agenda.
Although Iran has enormous economic potential,
its economy has faced chronic problems and been
unable to produce long-term growth.
Next, the Islamic Republic’s restrictions on both
elite and grass-roots social, political and cultural
freedoms, as well as poor state-civil society relations,
undermine Iran’s ability to create attractive sources
of soft power. Nye points out that the sources of soft
power are not monopolized by states to the same
extent that hard power is, but are largely produced
by civil society.57 Iran has ample material to create
sources of soft power that are attractive within Iran
and internationally, yet the regime’s limitations
on freedoms inside Iran as well as its recycling of
primary currencies from the first decade of revolution
and war prevent innovation in this area. The Islamic
Republic’s sources of soft power have not been
renovated to adequately synchronize with the
everyday experience and tastes of ordinary Iranians
today, particularly youth.
In the area of culture, there is a treasure trove of
artifacts from Shi’a culture, non-Islamic Iranian
culture, and the Islamic Republic’s culture which,
if adapted to contemporary circumstances, could
57 Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics.
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prove very attractive. Yet, for instance, despite the
capacity of Shi’a culture to capture a new generation
through novel forms and presentations, the regime
has insisted on an orthodox interpretation of this faith
and restrained lay and clerical religious intellectual
and artistic innovators, limiting its appeal. Nonreligious artists who have nonetheless shown interest
and competence in dealing with Shi’a themes
have found themselves impeded. Take the Islamic
Republic’s treatment of Bahram Bayzai, a pillar of
Iranian cinema who wrote the screenplay for The
Day of the Event, the popular film which masterfully
retells the story of Ashura, the Shi’a holy day that
commemorates the martyrdom of Imam Hossein.58
Not only has the Islamic Republic not been able
to create a film industry capable of absorbing and
facilitating the work of such a talent, but it has actually
impeded his career. We can also point to composer
Hossein Alizadeh’s acclaimed symphony Ney-Nava,
which has been interpreted as representing Imam
Hossein’s martyrdom on Ashura. Such works show
the potential of various musical forms to popularize
Shi’a culture.59 But rather than supporting innovative
indigenous music, no less than Khamenei himself has
spoken out against listening to and making music.
Fashion is another case in point. The regime has
fought against Western fashion since the revolution
and continually frets about the “immodest” fashion of
youth today. But it has it failed to formulate attractive
alternatives that most young Iranians today would
readily embrace; in many quarters the Islamic hijab
promoted by the regime is seen as a symbol of its
backwardness and oppression of women. This need
not be the case. Muslim women around the world,
especially in places like Turkey but also in Iran itself,
have been adapting the hijab into an Islamic fashion
that can be appealing while retaining its original goal
of religious modesty.
Non-Islamic Iranian culture has been consistently
marginalized because of the regime’s ideological
proclivity toward Shi’a Islam. But here too there is
much unexploited potential, which could help create
sources of soft power that could prove attractive and
Rooz-e Vaghe’eh (The Day of the Event). Dir. Shahram Asadi.
Screenplay by Bahram Bayzai. Hedayat Film, 1994. Film.
59 Hossein Alizadeh, Ney-Nava. Mahoor Publication, 1983. Cassette.
58
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counteract U.S. sources of soft power. Iranian classical
literature, from Ferdowsi to Molana to Khayam, is
deeply popular at the grass-roots level in Iran and
even in the West, where artists have interpreted such
works for modern audiences. But in Iran itself not
only is there little state support for promoting classical
culture, it is often treated with suspicion by Iranian
conservatives. Modern Iranian culture is perhaps even
more repressed and neglected than classical Iranian
culture. Giants of modern Iranian literature and poetry
such as Sadegh Hedayat, Mahmood Dowlatabadi and
Ahmad Shamloo are not actively promoted as some of
Iran’s finest cultural products, and it is left to Iranian
artists and ordinary people to highlight them inside
Iran and the diaspora.
Finally, the Islamic Republic’s culture since 1979
provides a reservoir with great potential to create
attractive sources of soft power. Take the Iran-Iraq
War, called the Holy Defense by the regime. The war,
potentially the most important event in the Islamic
Republic’s history, has a very important place in
the regime’s culture as a titanic struggle in which
the nation paid a tremendous price in blood and
treasure to defend itself against hostile foreign forces
bent on its destruction. Today, however, the war is
commemorated in much the same way it was during
the 1980s and 1990s, making it more difficult for
the younger generation to relate to it. Holy Defense
Cinema, a sub-genre of film in Iran dealing with the
war and its aftermath, today produces films that are
formulaic and ideological in their portrayal of the
war effort and come off as propaganda. Religious
filmmaker Morteza Aviny’s classic documentary
on Iranian soldiers on the frontlines of the war,
Narrative of Conquest, is a great example of a work
that was well received during its heyday more than
two decades ago but has lost much of its appeal due
to overuse by the regime and the inter-generational
disconnect in Iran.60
However, there are exceptions, such as Passion for
Flight,61 the popular Iranian television series about the
60 Ravayat-e Fath (Narrative of Conquest). Dir. Morteza Aviny. IRIB
1, Aviny. Online. Accessed 03 July 2013.
61 Passion for Flight (Shogh-e Parvaz). Dir. Yadollah Samadi. IRIB 1,
2007-2011. Film.

U.S.-trained F-14 Tomcat fighter pilot and martyred
war hero Abbas Baba’i, and Attack on H3,62 a war
film about the spectacular Iranian air force operation
against an Iraqi military base during the war. The
work of film director Ebrahim Hatamikia can also be
placed in this category, and the impediments placed
before him by the regime are emblematic of the
latter’s self-defeating approach to culture. An IranIraq War veteran and highly regarded filmmaker who
has specialized in Holy Defense Cinema, Hatamikia
has nonetheless faced numerous obstacles, such
as censorship from the Ministry of Culture and
Islamic Guidance, and has not received systematic
support to leverage his talent. The United States,
in contrast, has become quite adept at exploiting
the attractive cultural potential of its military and
conflicts around the globe. The U.S. Department of
Defense’s relationship with the American film and
television industry has produced many movies and
shows that lionize the U.S. military and contextualize
and promote U.S. foreign policy. Special operations
forces-themed television shows such as The Unit or
films such as Zero Dark Thirty are great illustrations
of this, helping create a culture that reinforces the
high social status of U.S. military personnel and their
mission.
Likewise, many of the regime’s political ideals date
back to the first decade after the revolution and have
lost much of their potency over the years. The theory
of the Guardianship of the Jurist is a case in point.
Conceived of as a divinely and popularly ordained
form of government and enthusiastically supported
by Iranians in 1979, this political ideal has become
less responsive to the popular will, resembling more
a form of sacred kingship. Yet here too innovative
clerical religious thinkers such as late Grand
Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri have proposed
ways of renovating this political ideal, which
maintains much of its content while allowing greater
popular participation. Montazeri’s interpretation of
the Guardianship of the Jurist sees its legitimacy as
coming through election by the people (entekhab). Yet
62

Attack On H-3 (Hamleh Be H-3). Dir. Shahriar Bahrani. Sureh
Cinema, 1994. Film.
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rather than seize on political ideals with the potential
to attract, the regime has responded by empowering
political ideals that move in the opposite direction,
such those espoused by Ayatollah MohammadTaghi Mesbah-Yazdi. He has argued for a version
of Guardianship of the Jurist whose legitimacy is
derived from God, in other words “installation”
(entesab) by the Shi’a clergy acting as intermediaries
for God. In this version of Guardianship of the Jurist
the people have little say.63
Policies are another source of soft power in which
the Islamic Republic has had a serious deficit in the
post-war era, not only because regime policies often
ignore the pulse of society but also because existing
policies have been riddled with failures. Let us look
at this in the context of the social, political and
economic spheres. In the social sphere the policy of
the regime has been to crack down on the impulse
of Iranian youth toward greater social freedom.
Iranian conservatives today interfere extensively
in the people’s social lives. The regime continues
to expend considerable energy carrying out raids
by police and other security forces on individuals
whom it deems inappropriately dressed. Or take the
regime’s 2012 decision to place limits on women’s
entry to universities and eliminate them from certain
majors altogether at some universities. In a world
in which the general trend for women appears to be
towards greater emancipation, this policy seeks to
limit the place of women in society, the economy and
politics. Policy shortcomings in the political sphere
have already been noted above, but are elaborated
upon here. The revolution of 1979 took place in part
as a reaction to the Shah Mohammad-Reza’s closing
of the political space—he de jure turned the country
into a single-party state—at a time when society had
become intensely politically conscious. Today, Iran’s
political system often also looks to be moving in the
direction of greater exclusion, even of some of its
own elites, despite an ever greater clamor by youth
to become engaged in politics.
The Islamic Republic’s greatest shortcoming,
however, has perhaps been in the economic realm,
despite Iran’s endowment with substantial natural
63
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and human resources. Successful economic policies
that benefit people can be a great source of soft power.
Take Japanese Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda’s famous
“Income-Doubling Plan” of 1960, which not only
promised economic growth but actually translated
this into tangible benefits for ordinary people.
Likewise the Communist Party of China (CPC) has
based a good deal of its legitimacy and appeal to
the world in the last two decades on its success in
generating economic growth. Iranian policies like
the “Targeted Subsidy Plan” (tarh-e hadafmanidiy-e
yaraneha), which sought to remove subsidies that had
become a great source of inefficiency in the Iranian
economy, could have been packaged as part of a
larger and more coherent economic plan that would
have stimulated growth and benefited citizens.64 But
political infighting has mangled implementation
of the plan, and it is now perceived as contributing
to inflation. Policies as a source of soft power can
be very attractive when they resonate with political
ideals, society’s needs and are successful. Policies in
the Islamic Republic often seem to do none of the
above.
Finally, the Islamic Republic has also been unable to
leverage institutions as a source of soft power. The
regime may not be in a position to create or utilize
global institutions to set the international agenda
the way the United States does. However, it can use
smaller-scale and local institutions to at least take
the initiative in setting the agenda within Iran and
perhaps even the region, especially through centers of
knowledge production such as universities, research
centers and policy think-tanks. The circumstances
for this do not yet exist in Iran. Centers of knowledge
production, especially universities, live under a
cloud of repression that stunts creativity and prevents
Iranian knowledge producers (students, professors,
researchers, etc.) from interacting with peers around
the globe and disseminating their ideas. As noted
earlier, much of Iran’s academic talent also goes
abroad due to poor conditions in Iran. Interestingly,
the Center for Strategic Research (CSR), headed by
Hassan Rouhani just prior to his election as president
64
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in June 2013, may be an important milestone in terms
of creating agenda-setting institutions as sources of
soft power and its work is likely to greatly inform the
Rouhani administration.
The Islamic Republic’s current, de facto, soft war
strategy appears to be having mixed results. The use
of hard responses has enabled the regime to limit
the diffusion of U.S. primary currencies in Iran. If
carried to its extreme, including cutting Iranians
off from the Internet, this may be successful in
reducing Iranians’ exposure to U.S. sources of soft
power. The regime’s inability to generate attractive
sources of soft power, however—which appears to

be a consequence of neglect rather than of failed
policy—is a fatal flaw in its strategy. Iranians are
not flocking to the regime; they are going abroad or
into their own private realms. To address this critical
shortcoming, the Islamic Republic would need to
strengthen its economy and, more importantly, allow
greater social, political and cultural freedoms—as
in the countries able to produce attractive sources
of soft power. As things stand, Iranians, particularly
youth, are susceptible to U.S. sources of soft power
and in many instances are becoming alienated from
the regime. This does not bode well for the regime’s
future.
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CONCLUSION
Soft war is a conflict rooted in Iran’s encounter with
Western imperialism from the 19th century onward,
and more specifically in the Islamic Republic’s
geopolitical conflict with the United States since
1979. It is the expression of two interwoven strands of
the regime’s, and specifically Iranian conservatives,’
DNA: Islamic nativism and anti-Americanism. For
a regime that claims an authentic Islamic identity,
rejects the influence of the United States, and has
the ambition to control much of its citizens’ social,
political, and cultural lives, the exercise of U.S. soft
power poses security challenges. Iranians attracted to
U.S. primary currencies can internalize their values,
thereby often simultaneously rejecting the values
of the regime. The divergence between regime and
society—strongly exacerbated by U.S. soft power—
is not an abstract concern, but one that can manifest
itself in the form of concrete security challenges,
forcing the regime to respond.
As we have argued, however, the Islamic Republic’s
soft war strategy is flawed, particularly in its ability
to create attractive indigenous sources of soft power.
This has led to a soft power deficit vis-à-vis the United
States. By focusing on a hard response, the regime
can limit the diffusion of U.S. primary currencies in
Iran. But this is not a real solution, because it does
not address the root cause of why U.S. primary
currencies have had such attractive power in Iran:
the relative unattractiveness of the regime’s own
primary currencies. Economic failure is one pillar of
this deficit. More important, however, is the regime’s
repression of civil society, particularly the artistic
and intellectual elites, who are often the creators of
attractive sources of soft power. These sources cannot
be mechanically produced by throwing money at
them, but require the participation of civil society to
come about. The Islamic Republic’s current soft war
strategy, though not a total defeat, is not a path to
victory.
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Still, this state of affairs cannot be taken for granted,
and at least two factors in the immediate future
could change this trajectory. One important factor
could be the election of Rouhani as president of the
Islamic Republic and the re-orientation of social,
cultural, and policies that could result. Rouhani’s
election campaign was in part premised on softening
certain aspects of recent Iranian government policy,
corresponding to the hard response discussed above,
while strengthening social, political, cultural, and
other freedoms, corresponding to the soft response.
If Rouhani fulfills these campaign promises, Iran
will be in a much better position to create attractive
sources of soft power. Another factor may be the
impact of U.S. economic sanctions on Iran. President
Barack Obama and the U.S. Congress, like U.S.
leaders before them, have claimed that the sanctions
and other policies that seek to pressure Iran are not
targeted at the Iranian people. But ordinary Iranians
are the ones suffering the most from the ways in
which sanctions have seriously exacerbated the
Iranian economy’s existing problems. These impacts
are reaching most levels of peoples’ lives, affecting
food prices, access to medicines, ability to travel and
study abroad, etc. This policy contradicts American
proclamations of friendship and respect toward
Iranians because it undeniably and very directly hurts
ordinary people and becomes a believable bogeyman
which the regime can exploit. This schizophrenic
policy, causing pain to what many believe to be
the most pro-American population in one of the
most anti-American regions, undermines the
attractiveness of U.S. sources of soft power in Iran.
This could alienate a new generation of Iranians, as
U.S. support for the Pahlavi regime did from 1953
onward, leading to a new wave of anti-Americanism.
The United States should consider its current policies
in light of this and the much longer history it has with
Iran, minimizing aspects which harm Iranians who
share much with the American people. After all, it
is these Iranians, and not the United States’ coercive
economic and military measures per se, who hold
out the best hope for a peaceful long-term friendship
between the two nations and an end to the soft war.
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